

of this the text has it that bird meats are light (*ὅτι τὰ ὀρνίθια κοῦφα*). Thus it would be truer to say that τὰ καθ' ἑκάστα in this passage are kinds of animals' meats—bird meats—than that they are individual birds, even though Aristotle and everyone else presumably would agree that, when one is on a diet, knowing which kinds of meat are light (*ποῖα*) won't do much good if it isn't known which individual animals (*τίνων*) have these kinds of meat.

Some scholars will have a philosophical difficulty with this. It is customary to render καθ' ἑκάστα by "particulars," and those who identify particulars with individuals will not see the sense of distinguishing, among particulars, individuals from kinds. Nor will they see the sense of distinguishing perceptible particulars from nonperceptible particulars. Hence Burnet's gloss on *περὶ τὰ καθ' ἑκάστα* in line 16:

The sphere (*περί*) or matter (*ἐν*) of *πράξις* is always the particular; for we cannot perform any act that is not a particular act. Hence our

deliberative analysis cannot be complete till we have carried it as far as the particular. In science this is impossible; for particulars are the objects of *αἴσθησις* alone.²

As Professor D. M. Balme has pointed out, however, "τὸ καθ' ἑκάστον, literally 'the each by each,' is Aristotle's expression for (a) the *infima species*, (b) the individual member of a species, also called the 'numerically one.' In zoology he is usually referring to the species . . ."³ And of course the reference before us in the *Ethica* is zoological.

In an effort to identify τὰ καθ' ἑκάστα as individuals, an editor might try to patch up the text by omitting epsilon and writing *ὀρνίθια* for *ὀρνίθια* (the birdies are light and healthful), following K^b. This would not do away with the difficulty posed by *ποῖα*; and when one distinguishes two senses of τὸ καθ' ἑκάστον as Balme does, the need for such an emendation disappears.⁴

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2. J. Burnet, *The Ethics of Aristotle* (London, 1900), p. 269.

3. D. M. Balme (trans.), *Aristotle: De partibus animalium I and De generatione animalium I* (Oxford, 1972), p. 106.

4. I wish to acknowledge the kind assistance of my colleagues R. Hamilton of the Departments of Greek and Latin and M. L. Lang of the Department of Greek, as well as of my student M. J. Logan of the Department of Philosophy.

ARISTOPHANES WASPS 74-77: THE MISSING VICE

Σω. Ἀμύνιας μὲν ὁ Προνάπους φήσ' οὕτοσι
εἶναι φιλόκυβον αὐτόν.

Ξα. ἄλλ' οὐδὲν λέγει, 75
μὰ Δί', ἀλλ' ἀφ' αὐτοῦ τὴν νόσον τεκμαίρεται.

Σω.

Ξα. οὐκ, ἀλλὰ "φιλο-" μὲν ἐστὶν ἀρχὴ τοῦ κακοῦ.

Several arrangements of speakers have been suggested in order to make sense of this passage, but Bergk, Meineke, Starkie, and now MacDowell (whose text I print) are surely right to posit a lacuna, wherein Sosias would pretend to report the suggestion of a member of the audience as to Philocleon's "disease." (On the problems involved, cf. MacDowell, *CQ*, N.S. XV [1965], 48 f.) Our next step should be to determine the missing guess, working back from the punch line. MacDowell's tentative suggestions, *φιλό-*

παις (called *νόσος* by Callim. *Epigr.* 46. 6) and *φιλογύνης*, and *φιλόδικος* (which MacDowell favors), inserted wrongly in line 77 by R, seem weak from this point of view. As a more plausible conjecture, I should like to suggest *φιλαρχος*, "desirous of holding office." It is certainly no objection that the word is not attested before Plato (*Rep.* 549A, *Phd.* 82C), for Aristophanes would have coined the word if necessary, as he has done with *φιλόκυβος* and *φιλοθύτης* in this very passage. The joke would now lie

in the rapid transfer of meaning given to ἀρχ-. Line 77 is best taken two ways at once: No, he is not

{ φίλαρχος, but his trouble does start with φιλο-.
desirous of office, but desire is the beginning of his trouble.

To translate thus, we must take φιλο- as subject and read ἀρχή (MacDowell overstates

the rule: the article would indeed mark the subject, but it is not necessary; cf. Isoc. 1. 33 ἀρχὴ γὰρ φιλίας μὲν ἔπαινος, ἔχθρας δὲ ψόγος), and take ἀλλὰ . . . μὲν in the “Xenophontine” sense of Krüger (*apud* Denniston, *Greek Particles*, pp. 365 f.).

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Jakob A. O. Larsen died on 1 September, 1974, at the age of 86 in Columbia, Missouri. Between 1939 and 1951 he guided the affairs of this journal, the fourth editor since its foundation. After laying down the editorship, and even after his retirement from the University of Chicago twenty years ago, Professor Larsen continued to publish numerous articles and reviews in *Classical Philology*. And the editors enjoyed the benefit of his generous and gentle advice until almost the day of his death.

A native of the Midwest, like some of his most eminent colleagues here, Professor Larsen came to the University of Chicago in 1930, after graduate study at the State University of Iowa, Yale, Oxford (where he was a Rhodes Scholar), and Harvard. He had already begun in his doctoral dissertation the research into Greek states of the Hellenistic and Roman periods which was to establish his reputation. Many papers followed, and a long study in Frank's *Economic*

Survey. But not until the years after retirement did he publish his books, *Representative Government in Greek and Roman History* in 1955 (originally given as the Sather Lectures in the preceding year, this book received the Award of Merit from the American Philological Association in 1957), and *Greek Federal States* in 1968. Indeed, the years as an Emeritus were no less prolific and energetic than the years before. Professor Larsen held Visiting Professorships at Rutgers and at the University of Texas as well as at California. And in 1960 he began what was virtually a second teaching career in the Department of History at the University of Missouri.

In his long life he earned many distinctions and strong affection. He will be missed by students, colleagues, and friends, who may nevertheless remind themselves, “satis diu vel naturae vixit vel gloriae.”

THE EDITORS